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A. MAX JARVIE*
ABSTRACT
While food security has long been a national or regional burden,
the advent of international instruments governing intellectual property
rights over conventionally bred plant varieties and genetically modified
plants has made the management of food security a global concern.
Current intellectual property regimes do not provide clear support for
innovations in crop productivity or biodiversity, both of which are impli-
cated in the long term stability of food supply. This Paper examines the
intellectual property regimes governing agricultural food stocks with re-
spect to the level of support they provide for three key research programs
in the development of crop seeds and plants: genetic modification, con-
ventional commercial breeding, and traditional breeding and seed ex-
change practices. In the result, current intellectual property regimes are
found to provide scant encouragement for biodiversity and a questionable
distribution of support across the three research programmes. By way of
response, the author proposes a solution through the introduction of a
utility model regime that could work in concert with both existing and pro-
posed national intellectual property laws and international instruments,
including the new Trans-Pacific Partnership. The proposed solution would
make possible improvements in the balance of support across the three
programs and greatly improve the potential for biodiversity by providing
powerful transnational protections of short duration for plant varieties,
accelerating the conventional breeding development cycle.
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INTRODUCTION
In his novel The Windup Girl,1 Paolo Bacigalupi shares with us
an unsettling vision of the future. The great majority of the world’s cul-
tivated food is grown from genetically engineered seeds, invented and
controlled by a small number of corporations.2 Most, if not all, natural
varieties have vanished, having succumbed to a combination of economic
forces and natural disaster.3 The genetic modifications in the commer-
cially produced seeds provide resistance to diseases crafted to attack food
1 See generally PAOLO BACIGALUPI, THE WINDUP GIRL (2009) (describing a future Thailand
in a world dominated by GMOs in Bacigalupi’s hard science fiction novel).
2 See id.
3 See id.
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plants as part of the biowarfare and competition strategies of various
state and non-state actors, including, of course, the genetically engineered
seed companies themselves.4 Each season, seed must be replaced with
new modified stock, in order to stay ahead of the aggressively mutating
synthetic microorganisms.5
Like many dystopian fantasies, Bacigalupi’s tale provides implied
commentary about the fragility of the international order and the tooth-
lessness of international agreements in the absence of such order. Although
the international community of his fictional world has not completely dis-
appeared, there does not appear to be any operational concept of food
security, nor any notion of a human right to food, in the world he depicts.
Nor does there seem to be significant impetus to international enforcement
of intellectual property rights by legislative means: the seed companies
enforce their rights over their genetically modified materials through
private armies and bioterrorism.
This vision is a disturbing one, but we need not turn to fiction to
find unsettling possible futures. The world faces an enormous challenge
to achieving sustainable food security. In addition to the almost 800 mil-
lion people who suffer from chronic hunger in the present,6 the outlook
for the next twenty years projects an increase in food demand of 50%.7
We may couple that finding with projections for increased demands on
energy (50% by 2030) and water (30% by 2030)8 to conclude that, without
a significant increase in the productivity of existing arable land that does
not depend upon a concomitant increase in water or energy input,9 a
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INT’L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV., & WORLD
FOOD PROGRAMME, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD: MEETING THE 2015
INTERNATIONAL HUNGER TARGETS: TAKING STOCK OF UNEVEN PROGRESS 4 (2015), avail-
able at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4646e.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTM9-ZP9A].
7 See Rob Bertram, Innovation and Biodiversity, PUBLIC INTEREST INTELLECTUAL PROP.
ADVISORS (PIIPA) 4 (2013), http://web.archive.org/web/20131116020129/http://piipa.org
/files/PIIPA_The%20Role%20of%20Intellectual%20Property%20in%20Food%20Security
_Seminar%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MHP-WKWE] (seminar slide summary).
8 See Denise Dewar, The Role of Intellectual Property in Food Security in Developing
Countries, PUBLIC INTEREST INTELLECTUAL PROP. ADVISORS (2013), http://web.archive.org
/web/20131116020129/http://piipa.org/files/PIIPA_The%20Role%20of%20Intellectual%20
Property%20in%20Food%20Security_Seminar%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPZ5
-9JFM] (seminar slide summary).
9 See GORDON CONWAY, THE DOUBLY GREEN REVOLUTION: FOOD FOR ALL IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (1997) (calling for conservation as well as productivity in a second agri-
cultural revolution).
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classic Malthusian crisis10 may well develop. Indeed, if we hope to achieve
the yields we need, we will have to improve upon the current productivity
improvement curve; between 1980 and today, we have increased produc-
tivity per hectare by only 40% (from 1.8 tonnes/ha to 2.5 tonnes/ha).11
Addressing our future food security problems will require innova-
tive thinking on both scientific12 and legislative13 fronts. From a policy
perspective, we need to identify the contribution made by different crop
seed research programs towards the goal of increasing sustainable pro-
ductivity; we then need to examine the intellectual property rights re-
gimes that govern them, in order to ensure that the law—insofar as it
can—supports an optimal level of innovative output in each program.
This Paper will not attempt an exhaustive survey of all possible
research programs, formal and informal, that might be considered as
having a role to play in food security. Instead, it concentrates on three
issues—genetic modification, breeding, and traditional crop improvement
practices—that support between them the two food security goals of in-
creasing productivity (through yield and hardiness) and stability of food
supply (through biodiversity). This Paper will show how the current IPR
regimes in national and international law affect these research programs
and proposes changes that may offer a better distribution of support
among them.
Given that this Paper began by drawing attention to the unfortu-
nate possibilities of a world in which advanced scientific knowledge about
genetic engineering and powerful commercial interests intersect, it may
come as a surprise to the reader that this Essay treats the importance of
support for genetically modified (“GM”) food research as an operating
assumption. Despite the risks that GM food technology and the market
actors controlling it pose to health and to policy respectively, the potential
10 See Jeffery D. Sachs, Are Malthus’s Predicted 1798 Food Shortages Coming True?, SCI.
AM. (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/are-malthus-predicted-1798
-food-shortages/ [https://perma.cc/TSE6-KA9L].
11 See Dewar, supra note 8. There are improvements besides raw productivity increases
that could be addressed: increasing arable land and reducing food wastage are two possi-
ble ways to increase the food supply without depending on the achievement of new levels
of productivity per hectare. Any improvements made here, however, could only be auxil-
iaries to increases in raw productivity: increasing arable land and reducing waste will not
provide a 50% increase in food supply. Moreover, both approaches will likely involve
increased use of water (e.g., engineering deserts into arable land through irrigation) or
energy (better refrigeration, faster transport of harvests to minimize spoilage).
12 See ISMAIL SERAGELDIN & G. J. PERSLEY, PROMETHEAN SCIENCE: AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE POOR 6 (July 7, 2010).
13 See Dewar, supra note 8.
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benefits are too great, and the policy planning timescales on which we
are operating too short, to realistically contemplate banning its develop-
ment or sale. Genetic modification has already assisted us in achieving
significant increases in crop productivity, through the development of
crops that are capable of thriving under a broader range of conditions
than their natural counterparts: modified to divert more photosynthetic
energy to grain rather than leaf or stem, or modified to permit the use of
virulent herbicides without harming plant growth.14 Naturally, we should
remain alive to the potential hazards associated with GM foods, trans-
genic agricultural stocks in particular. The increased crop yields of the
sort that are likely to overcome the challenges of the next few decades,
however, will almost certainly require further scientific research into
transgenic plants.15
Innovation in conventional breeding, meanwhile, deserves an equal
amount of encouragement. Modern commercial conventional breeding
has a lower risk profile16 for unforeseen consequences than genetic modi-
fication, which translates in practice into a lower regulatory burden. Com-
mercial breeding, with suitable incentives, may also offer support for
biodiversity—which, as we shall discuss, contributes to stabilization of
aggregate crop yields. Any solution that hopes to adequately address food
security in the twenty-first century, therefore, will likely involve both
conventional methods and genetic engineering; under our current form
of economic organization, as we shall see below, this entails supporting
each research program through intellectual property rights (“IPRs”).
Finally, the traditional practices of farmers who save and exchange
seeds, using these seeds to replant but also to breed new varieties, should
receive policy stimulus as well. These longstanding practices, operating
14 See PHILIPPE CULLET, INT’L ENVTL. L. RES. CTR., FOOD SECURITY AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (2003), available at http://www.ielrc.org
/content/w0303.pdf [https://perma.cc/DAX7-V6NH]; see also Sachin Chaturvedi, Agri-
cultural Biotechnology and New Trends in IPRs Regime: Challenges Before Developing
Countries, 37 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1212 (2002); R. DAVID KRYDER ET AL., INT’L SERV. FOR
ACQUISITION AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, THE INTELLECTUAL AND TECHNICAL PROPERTY
COMPONENTS OF PRO-VITAMIN A RICE (GOLDEN RICE™) A PRELIMINARY FREEDOM-TO-
OPERATE REVIEW (2000).
15 See Dewar, supra note 8. But see Jonathon Knight, Crop Improvement: Dying Breed,
421 NATURE 568, 570 (2003); Ann Marie Thro & Paul Zankowski, Classical Plant Breed-
ing Is the Route to Food Security, 422 NATURE 559, 559 (2003); and Keith Aoki, Malthus,
Mendel, and Monsanto, Intellectual Property and the Law and Politics of Global Food
Supply, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 397, 414 (2004) (arguing that conventional improvement
techniques alone can provide the productivity solutions we will need for the future).
16 A caveat: certain methods in modern commercial breeding invite the conclusion that
the risk profile may not be uniformly lower. See infra Part I.
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on extended timescales, constitute an informal yield improvement and
seed biodiversification research program in their own right.
In order to elucidate the interaction of IPR laws and their rela-
tionship to the three research programs mentioned, this Paper proposes
to make a survey of several salient elements before proceeding to analy-
sis. It begins with a very brief overview of the research methods employed
by genetic modification and modern commercial breeding. The discussion
then turns to the importance of biodiversity for food security, and the role
played by traditional practices in this regard. This will be followed by a
synopsis of several national and international legislative instruments
that affect IPRs for both plant varieties and transgenic plants, in order
to illustrate how food security concerns get cashed out in law.
From the discussion, the following conclusions will be drawn.
Taken in the aggregate, the current international regime has an
uncertain relationship to traditional practices at best. To the extent that
these practices offer a reserve of genetic diversity in seed stock, they
ought to be of interest to legislators; but, the legislative methods used to
incentivize research programs that may rapidly produce significant
increases in crop yield reveal a distinct tendency to minimize support for
these traditions.
Effective improvements, however, can be made by providing stron-
ger IPRs with shorter terms. For a variety of reasons that will be discussed
below, this is neither practical nor desirable in the case of transgenic
plants; but, it does seem to be a realistic possibility in the case of plant
varieties produced through conventional breeding, and may have salu-
tary benefits for both the innovative capacity of commercial breeding
R&D cycles and traditional farming practices. The Paper concludes by
proposing the use of a legislative framework involving a form of intellec-
tual property protection known as the “utility model,” which may improve
the distribution of support without falling afoul of existing legislative
schemes or international treaties.
As international agreements intended to guide the harmonization
of IPRs at a global level become further entrenched, legislative choices
made by member states will play a crucial role in the future trajectory of
food security. Even with the instruments currently in play, those choices
can be sculpted in ways that may provide an effective compromise across
the three programs we have mentioned—despite the relative inflexibility
that circumstances dictate with respect to genetically modified plants.
That our future will be beholden to the development of transgenic
crops and the use of commercially bred seed is likely inevitable, and we
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need to be realistic about the kinds of compromise that will require; but
Bacigalupi’s unsettling nightmares need not follow.
I. BREEDING AND GENETIC MODIFICATION
A. Conventional Breeding
It bears mentioning from the outset that conventional breeding
and genetic modification are in the same business: mixing genes into new
functional genotypes, with an eye to encouraging the phenotypic expres-
sion of particular traits.17 Breeders do this in several ways. The primary
method is to find plants with interesting traits and attempt to cross-
pollinate them with other related plants that have other desirable traits.18
When the crossing yields a successfully germinating plant, the modern
breeder will frequently test the tissue of the result for gene markers, to see
whether all the desired genetic traits have crossed over into the child.19
Such cross-breeding is typically repeated many thousands of times before
the desired combination of traits is achieved.20 The use of genetic mark-
ers can add some efficiency to the process by allowing breeders to see
whether the desired cocktail of traits is present, without waiting for the
seedling tested to come to maturity and display full phenotypic expres-
sion of the desired traits; where the combination sought is absent, the
breeder can destroy the batch and begin a new round of crossing.21 How-
ever, even where the desired genotypic combination is detected, the breed-
ers must then wait to see whether the traits express correctly.
Modern breeders will also attempt to create interesting traits by
inducing mutations. Such research is much less targeted than traditional
crossing and conscious selection of desirable traits, as it amounts to
“rolling the dice and hoping to get something interesting.”22 From a
methodological perspective, this sounds implausible, but the results are
17 See COMM. ON ENVTL. IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH COMMERCIALIZATION OF TRANSGENIC
PLANTS, BD. ON AGRIC. & NAT. RES., DIV. ON EARTH & LIFE STUDIES, & NAT’L. RESEARCH
COUNCIL, ENVTL. EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC PLANTS: THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF REG-
ULATION 37 (2002).
18 See id.
19 See id. at 37, 41–42.
20 See Nathanael Johnson, Genetic Engineering vs. Natural Breeding: What’s the difference?,
GRIST (July 16, 2013), http://grist.org/food/genetic-engineering-vs-natural-breeding-whats
-the-difference [https://perma.cc/S8HS-RT6N].
21 See id.
22 See id.
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sometimes successful.23 It bears remarking here that, in addition to being
a fairly substantial departure from traditional crossing techniques, irra-
diative methods may actually induce more genetic changes in a plant
than genetic engineering.24
B. Genetic Modification
In contrast to these approaches, genetic modification appears at
first glance to be much more precise. The first step is identification of a
gene that expresses a particular trait, followed by isolation of the gene of
interest.25 The gene will be cloned inside a host cell prepared for the pur-
pose, and the copies made are then “packaged.”26 The package may consist
of a genetic sequence that includes the gene of interest itself, a promoter
and a terminator (to activate and deactivate the gene, respectively), and
another gene for a separate, visible trait that can act as a marker for the
presence of the package.27 This phase of genetic engineering is quite pre-
cise, and the methods employed reliably produce the intended sequence
of traits that form the elements of the package.
The introduction of the gene into the target plant is usually
undertaken through one of two methods: biolistic transformation or
agrobacterium-mediated transformation.28 Biolistic transformation em-
ploys what is colloquially known as a “gene gun” which fires particles
coated with gene packages at living plant tissue.29 Such application
of mechanical force will sometimes result in the contents of the gene
package being incorporated into cell nuclei through natural cellular
23 Calrose 76 rice, for example, was developed from seed deliberately exposed to 25 kR of
Cobalt-60 gamma radiation. See J.N. Rutger et al., Registration of ‘Calrose 76’ rice,¬
GRAMENE, http://archive.gramene.org/newsletters/varieties/Calrose76.html [https://perma
.cc/8HH2-5FLW] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
24 See Rita Batista et al., Microarray Analyses Reveal That Plant Mutagenesis May Induce
More Transcriptomic Changes Than Transgene Insertion, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
U.S. 3640, 3640 (2008).
25 See Pocket K No. 17: Genetic Engineering and GM CROPS,¬INT’L SERV. FOR ACQUISITION
AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS (Aug. 2014), http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications
/pocketk/17 [https://perma.cc/2EYX-9BVP] [hereinafter Pocket K].
26 See id.
27 See How Do You Make a Transgenic Plant?,¬TRANSGENIC CROPS (Mar. 11, 2004), http://
cls.casa.colostate.edu/transgeniccrops/how.html [https://perma.cc/CVT2-ZSSA].
28 See Caixia Gao & Klaus Nielsen, Comparison Between Agrobacterium-Mediated and
Direct Gene Transfer Using the Gene Gun, METHODS MOLECULAR BIOLOGY, Jan. 2013, at
3–4.
29 See Johnson, supra note 20.
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processes.30 One advantage of this method is that multiple genes may be
combined or “stacked” into the same package payload and delivered
through a single insertion.31 The process, however, has been noted to re-
sult in the insertion of multiple copies of the gene package as well as
integration of incomplete fragments.32
The scattershot approach of biolistic insertion stands in sharp
contrast to the agrobacterium method. Agrobacterium-mediated transfor-
mation leverages the natural capacity of agrobacterium tumefaciens to
transfer DNA between itself and plants through the use of gene fragments
called plasmids.33 The gene package is first groomed into a plasmid, and
then swapped out for the native agrobacterium plasmid; the target plant
is then infected with the bacterium, which then transfers the gene pack-
age into the nuclei of the plant’s cells.34 This method consistently yields
single-site35 and single-copy36 gene insertions and has higher transforma-
tional efficiency than biolistic insertion.37 However, the plasmid method
does not allow for the stacking of multiple genes, which are needed for the
pursuit of sophisticated genetic manipulation strategies.38 Moreover, the
method does not work for all plants. In consequence, despite the greater
precision of the agrobacterium-mediated method, the biolistic method
remains popular and its use widespread.39
The methods employed by genetic engineers are indifferent to the
actual genetic payload to be inserted. This allows for genetic engineer-
ing’s most notorious and sensational capacity: the insertion of genes from
radically different organisms and the consequent successful phenotypic
expression of those genes within the new hosts.40
30 See id.
31 See Gao & Nielsen, supra note 28, at 3.
32 See F.D. Meyer & M.J. Giroux, Section II.2 Wheat, in TRANSGENIC CROPS IV 55, 63
(Eng-Chong Pua & Michael Davey eds., 2007); see also Gao & Nielsen, supra note 28, at
3–4.
33 See Meyer & Giroux, supra note 32, at 62.
34 See id.
35 See Marc De Block & Dirk Debrouwer, Two T-DNAs Co-transformed into Brassica
Napus by a Double Agrobacterium Tumefaciens Infection Are Mainly Integrated at the
Same Locus, 82 THEORETICAL & APPLIED GENETICS 257 (1991); Sylvie De Buck et al., The
DNA Sequences of T-DNA Junctions Suggest That Complex T-DNA Loci Are Formed by
a Recombination Process Resembling T-DNA Integration, 20 PLANT J. 295, 295 (1999).
36 See Gao & Nielsen, supra note 28, at 4.
37 See Meyer & Giroux, supra note 32, at 63.
38 See Gao & Nielsen, supra note 28, at 4.
39 See id.
40 See, e.g., Richard Hellmich & Kristina Hellmich, Use and Impact of Bt Maize, NATURE
EDUC. KNOWLEDGE (2012), http://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/use-and
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This is not in itself necessarily alarming. Combined, however, with
the known tendency of the biolistic method to introduce multiple copies
and fragments of packaged sequences41 and the pressure to use that
method in order to exploit the efficiency of single-shot gene stacking,42
the net effect in practice is that current genetic engineering strategies for
plant improvement employ a set of methods whose possible consequences
are not well-understood.43 The incorporation of desired traits into a plant
will sometimes be accompanied by the alteration of other traits;44 the con-
sequences of those unintended transformations may not be detected until
long after the plants have been introduced into the food supply system.45
This does not mean such research should not be pursued. Despite
being a nascent research program, genetic engineering has already yielded
spectacular short-to-medium-term outcomes.46 Because we lack both a
sophisticated understanding of the results of genetic modifications and
a data set large enough to provide input for long-term analysis, however,
conventional methods still hold attraction owing to their long track rec-
ord in the field and the relatively conservative character of the changes
they introduce. Briefly put: viewed from the combined perspective of
-impactof-bt-maize-46975413 [https://perma.cc/MP4Q-S9B7] (noting that Bt Maize imports
a gene with insecticidal activity from a bacterium and explaining its impact).
41 See Meyer & Giroux, supra note 32, at 63.
42 See Gao & Nielsen, supra note 28, at 4.
43 See Meyer & Giroux, supra note 32, at 61.
44 A clear example of this is the pleiotropic effect (when one gene influences two or more
seemingly unrelated phenotypic traits) observed on plants engineered with the bar gene,
which produces resistance to the herbicide glusofinate. One study funded by the Canadian
Food Inspection Agency showed that of the genes unique to transgenic plants that differ-
ently expressed in reaction to glusofinate exposure, many had no known function. See
Ashraf Abdeen & Brian Miki, The Pleiotropic effects of the Bar Gene and Glusofinate on
the Arabidopsis Transcriptome, 7:3 PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 266, 266 (2009). Unin-
tended effects have also been observed in transgenic plants engineered to overexpress
oryzacystatin I, which has insecticidal activity. It has been noted, for example, that the
overexpression of this gene affects plant growth systems. See Rafael Gutiérrez-Campos
et al., Pleiotropic Effects in Transgenic Tobacco Plants Expressing the Oryzacystatin I
Gene 36:1 HORTICULTURAL SCI. 118, 118–19 (2001).
45 See, e.g., Harry A. Kuiper et al., Adequacy of Methods for Testing the Safety of Genetically
Modified Foods, 354 THE LANCET 1315, 1315–16 (1999) (where the authors note that cur-
rent methods for testing foods concentrate on macro/micro nutrients and known toxins).
Since it is known that transgenic plants may express genes in unexpected ways, see
Meyer & Giroux, supra note 32, testing for other elements, such as mRNA fingerprinting,
proteomics and secondary metabolite profiling, is desirable. In the absence of such rigor-
ous testing, new toxins or other agents may be unwittingly introduced into the environ-
ment or the food supply system.
46 I consider, in this connection, the advent of Monsanto’s Roundup-ready wheat as an
important success in the pursuit of increased crop productivity.
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experimental method and potential outcome, both research programs
have their merits and deserve protection.
II. FOOD SECURITY AND BIODIVERSITY
The first international discussions of food security emphasized
quantity and availability of supply.47 Modern formulations also incorpo-
rate other criteria we have come to recognize as germane, such as quality
and nutritional value:
Food security [is] a situation that exists when all people,
at all times, have physical, social and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.48
Despite such nuancing, the underlying goal remains unchanged:
to ensure the availability of food and encourage the development of food
production systems sufficient to stabilize such availability in the face of
rising demand curves.
Achievement of such a goal, as already mentioned, will be unlikely
without significant and sustained investment into research concerned
with increasing the productivity of food production systems. That research
is intended to address the need for adequate quantity; it does not directly
address the stability of supply.
Biodiversity is known to have stabilizing effects on the biomass
productivity of a given ecosystem.49 As biodiversity increases, the likeli-
hood that the ecosystem will contain species that possess traits adaptive to
environmental changes increases as well.50 Moreover, the presence of di-
verse traits within a given species can buffer the ecosystem against the loss
of still other species, increasing overall resilience.51 Biodiversity thereby
provides a form of insurance against the deleterious effects of change.52
47 Report of the World Food Conference, Nov. 5–16, 1994 (“availability at all times of
adequate world supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food con-
sumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices”).
48 FAO Policy Brief on Food Security, Issue 2 at 1 (June 2006), http://www.fao.org/forestry
/13128-0e6f36f27e0091055bec28ebe830f46b3.pdf [https://perma.cc/473C-N7X3].
49 See Elsa E. Cleland, Biodiversity and Ecosystem Stability, NATURE EDUC. KNOWLEDGE
3:10(14) (2011), http://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/biodiversity-and-eco
system-stability-17059965 [https://perma.cc/T6KF-GAVN].
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Shigeo Yachi & Michael Loreau, Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functioning in a Fluctuating
Environment: The Insurance Hypothesis, 96 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 1463 (1999); David
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It is not difficult to transfer these environmental science insights
into the context of crop production. Arable land is spread across many
different ecosystems, each with its own climate and disease profile; more-
over, the stability of many such systems is eroding as climate change ac-
celerates. Agricultural biodiversity can provide a buffer against changes
in these variables; we depend upon sustained levels of agricultural pro-
ductivity, and biodiversity provides stabilization for such productivity.
We can therefore benefit from ensuring diversity in crop production sys-
tems, both from the breeding of new varieties and from the exchange of
seeds and other propagation materials.
The dangers of monoculture are well-understood but must com-
pete with the pressure from food industry markets that favour product
uniformity and its concomitant predictability from both cost and revenue
perspectives.53 The recent history of banana cultivation offers a clear ex-
ample. The twentieth century saw the demise of the gros michel banana,
cultivated primarily for consumption in the industrialized nations, and
a subsequent worldwide banana shortage.54 As the plantations bearing
the gros michel were ravaged by disease, they were supplanted by a new
variety: the cavendish, which we find in supermarkets worldwide today.55
Despite the fact that it was clear to the farmers and industrial plantation
owners that their crop had been devastated because of their reliance on
a single variety, the demand for product uniformity was sufficient to in-
duce the wholesale replacement of the gros michel by the cavendish;56 we
traded one monoculture for another. History repeats itself. As it now
stands, we will almost certainly observe the demise of the cavendish va-
riety as an industrial crop by 2020.57
Even if monoculture were restricted to bananas alone, it would
have a significant impact on global food security. Behind rice, wheat, and
maize, bananas and plantains constitute the 4th largest global crop by
Tilman et al., Biodiversity and Ecosystem Stability in a Decade-Long Grassland Experi-
ment, 441 NATURE 629 (2006); Yongfei Bai et al., Ecosystem Stability and Compensatory
Effects in the Inner Mongolia Grassland, 431 NATURE 181 (2004); D.W. Schindler, Experi-
mental Perturbations of Whole Lakes as Tests of Hypotheses Concerning Ecosystem Struc-
ture and Function, 57 OIKOS 25 (1990).
53 See Dan Koeppel, Can This Fruit Be Saved?, POPULAR SCI. (June 19, 2005), http://
www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2008-06/can-fruit-be-saved [https://perma.cc/Y4QR-CSF2].
54 Id.
55 See Phoebe Sedgman, There Might Be No Saving The World’s Top Banana, BLOOMBERG
BUS. (June 4, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-04/banana-killer
-on-the-march-fuels-risk-of-fruit-s-next-extinction [https://perma.cc/Q436-AV5L].
56 Id.
57 Id.
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cash value58 and a staple part of the diet of hundreds of millions world-
wide.59 In some areas, widely cultivated staple varieties are succumbing
to a wilt to which they have no resistance.60 Many varieties of banana are
still cultivated in small quantities, however, and this reserve of biodi-
versity is being used to breed new cultivars that are resistant to current
widespread diseases.61 Even if biodiversity cannot be achieved at indus-
trial scales because of market pressures, future productivity may well
depend upon our ensuring at least some level of biodiversity for each
given agricultural region and crop.
Traditionally, the diversification and breeding of cultivars was the
domain of farmers themselves.62 The distinction between farmer and
commercial breeder that modern legislation contemplates did not exist.
The role of farmers in safeguarding biodiversity is widely recognized; the
Food and Agriculture Organization has acknowledged “the past, present
and future contribution of farmers . . . in conserving, improving, and mak-
ing available plant genetic resources.”63 The Convention on Biological
Diversity has also recognized that farmers “play a key role as custodians
and managers of agricultural biodiversity.”64 The European Union (“EU”)
has even indicated its concern over the loss of traditional farming methods
as creating a threat both to “biodiversity on farmland” as well as to nat-
ural and semi-natural habitats that traditional farming has safeguarded
in the past.65
It may be that modern farmers invest much less time in breeding
than before, but they still engage in seed exchange, another potential route
to increasing biodiversity.66 Seed exchange practices are often tied up
58 Bob Holmes, Go Bananas, 2913 NEW SCIENTIST 39, 39–41 (April 2013).
59 Banana and Plantain, CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INT’L AGRIC. RESEARCH, http://www
.cgiar.org/our-research/crop-factsheets/bananas/ [https://perma.cc/SWV7-Z9Q7].
60 Xan Rice, Ugandan Scientists Grow GM Banana as Disease Threatens Country’s Staple
Food, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/09/gm
-banana-crop-disease-uganda [https://perma.cc/LF34-A63K].
61 Holmes, supra note 58.
62 See Hans Hurnij et al., Agriculture at the Crossroads, INT’L ASSESSMENT FOR AGRIC.
KNOWLEDGE, SCI. & TECH. FOR DEV. (2009), http://www.unep.org/dewa/agassessment/re
ports/IAASTD/EN/Agriculture%20at%20a%20Crossroads_Global%20Report%20(English)
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENX2-5B4T].
63 S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-19.
64 Why is it Important?, CONVENTION ON BIODIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/agro/impor
tance.shtml [https://perma.cc/PJ76-EF5G] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
65 See Agriculture and Biodiversity, EUROPEAN COMM’N (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/agricul
ture/envir/biodiv/ [https://perma.cc/2SR6-VYYF].
66 See Marco Pautasso et al., Seed Exchange Networks for Agrobiodiversity Conservation:
A Review, 33 AGRONOMY SUSTAINABLE DEV. 151, 151–52 (2013); Laura Calvet-Mir et al.,
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with a variety of social norms and other motivations totally unrelated to
improved yield, biodiversity, or conservation goals.67 Because the practice
is extremely widespread in traditional farming communities, particularly
in the developing world, it constitutes an enormous—albeit informal—
continuously operating research program in agricultural biodiversity
whose importance to global food security should not be underestimated.
In the developed world, there has been widespread adoption of
monocultural production,68 accompanied by a decline in seed exchange
and a migration towards seed supply through commercial breeders.69
Current statutory instruments in the developed world have had an effect
on seed exchange, and insofar as seed exchange is a contributing factor
to sustaining crop biodiversity, it is clear that current IPR regimes exert
at least some pressure here.70
For all the recognition of the contribution of traditional farming
practices to biodiversity, however, it is not clear that changes to or re-
strictions on such traditional practices will necessarily lead to a cata-
strophic decline in biodiversity. A well-modulated statutory regime may
be able to sustain those practices and, perhaps, encourage other avenues
of biodiversity development.
We may conclude this section with the following observations.
Population pressures require increased crop yields. Genetic engineering
and modern commercial breeding between them offer the most realistic
possibility of generating new, safe food crops with increased yields. The
result of this research, when successful, usually results in the widespread
distribution of a small number of highly desirable varieties, undercutting
agricultural biodiversity. Yet biodiversity provides insurance on multiple
levels, stabilizing crop yields in the face of disease, local environmental
changes, and the unpredictable broader consequences of climate change.
Of the three research programs we are exploring in this Paper, tradi-
tional practices appear to contribute a good deal to biodiversity. As such,
so long as a substitute program with similar benefits is not available,
these practices deserve some measure of support along with conventional
Seed Exchange as an Agrobiodiversity Conservation Mechanism: A Case Study in Vall
Fosca, Catalan Pyrenees, Iberian Peninsula, 17 ECOLOGY & SOCIETY (2012), available at
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss1/art29/ [https://perma.cc/7GV2-VTHG].
67 See Pautasso et al., supra note 66, at 156.
68 Id. at 157.
69 Id.
70 Joreon van Wijk, How Does Stronger Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Affect Seed
Supply? Early Evidence of Impact, OVERSEAS DEV. INST. (1996), http://www.odi.org/sites
/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2965.pdf [https://perma.cc/646P-2VSB].
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breeding and transgenic research. In the next two sections, we will
consider the extent to which the current IPR landscape supports these
three programs.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: INVENTION, INNOVATION, AND
CAPITAL-INTENSIVE RESEARCH
A comprehensive survey of the wide variety of motivations for IPR
regimes is beyond the scope of this Essay. A few remarks, however, will
help illuminate the likely policy connection between IPRs and modern
food production.
The dominant contemporary narrative is that IPRs provide an
incentive to create.71 In the case of patents, the underlying motivation is
the practical benefit that can arise from the kind of creation that patents
protect: useful invention.72 The protection offered is part of a bargain: in
exchange for an exclusive right of exploitation, the inventor discloses his
invention for public inspection and understanding, allowing others to
consider its utility in other contexts, and conduct research towards those
ends, even while the patent is in force.73 In this way, so the dominant
narrative goes, the patent system strikes a balance between providing
incentives to create and ensuring that new knowledge is made public,
such that it can nourish the next generation of inventions.74
As seductive as it may be, there are reasons to doubt the extent
to which this narrative fully explains the current IPR system. It does not,
for example, explain the length of patent grants as twenty years, as op-
posed to three, five, or fifty, nor does it explain why a uniform term ap-
plies to all patents regardless of the field in which they are granted.75
Moreover, the narrative does not make clear why we should assume that
this method of providing pecuniary reward for the creative activity of
invention efficiently allocates resources. It is true that the possibility of
such reward may encourage those with sufficient talent to channel their
energies towards invention, but it will also divert the resources of those
71 See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8. (“[T]he Progress of Science and useful Arts.”)
72 Id. With respect to copyright and trademark, the motivations are more nebulous but
still connected to the public good: “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.” See Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
73 See generally Twentieth Century Music Corp, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
74 See generally id.
75 Id. (describing the desire to reward the producer with a fair gain while keeping in mind
the ultimate goal of stimulating creativity).
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without such creative talents who dream of striking it rich, when their
time and effort could be put to better use elsewhere.
One obvious answer is that our IPR regime is more directly con-
cerned with supporting innovation within the system of private capital
investment that we have adopted as a model for economic growth. Some
fields require significant capital input for infrastructure and the pooling
of talent in order to innovate with any degree of consistency. Insofar as
innovation in a particular sector requires concentration of capital that
the state is unwilling to take out of tax revenues, there must be incentives
for private investment. In such cases, the narrative of IPRs as incentives
makes better sense.
Biotechnology research, for example, is well served by the current
regime. Pharmaceutical development, stem cell and regenerative medi-
cine research, and genetically modified food source development all re-
quire significant capital outlays up front in order to fund both basic and
translational research.76
The same is true, to a lesser extent, of the activities of commercial
breeders. Conventional breeding is an activity that can be undertaken
without sophisticated equipment or deeply specialized knowledge; tradi-
tionally, farmers have provided a source of new varieties of plants through
their own informal breeding experiments.77 Competing in a commercial
breeding market, however, requires sophisticated generation techniques
(e.g., irradiation), diagnostic methods (e.g., gene markers), and formal
training.78 As such, commercial breeding requires significant capital
outlays and could thereby benefit from an IPR incentive scheme as well.
76 See Neal Masia, Focus on Intellectual Property Rights, The Cost of Developing a New
Drug, U.S. Dep’t of State (Apr. 23, 2008), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/pub
lication/2008/04/20080429230904myleen0.5233981.html#axzz41WKSNCFC [https://perma
.cc/36DQ-MWCQ]; see also Don Gibbons, Stem Cell Stories that Caught Our Eye; Drug
Screening, Aging Stem Cells in Brain Repair and Blood Diseases, THE STEM CELLAR, CIRM
(March 13, 2015), http://blog.cirm.ca.gov/2015/03/13/stem-cell-stories-that-caught-our-eye
-drug-screening-aging-stem-cells-in-brain-repair-and-blood-diseases/ [https://perma.cc
/J9D2-7E2H]; Chantal Pohl Nielsen et al.,Trade in Genetically Modified Food: A Survey
of Empirical Studies, Int’l Food Policy Research Inst., (Nov. 2002), http://ageconsearch
.umn.edu/bitstream/16317/1/tm020106.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3HL-UAAR].
77 Norman E. Borlaug, Contributions of Conventional Plant Breeding to Food Production,
219 SCIENCE 689 (Feb. 11, 1983), available at http://libcatalog.cimmyt.org/download/borlaug
/719.pdf [https://perma.cc/93KD-SJL5].
78 See generally Satoru Ishikawa et al., Ion-Beam Irradiation, Gene Identification, and
Marker-Assisted Breeding in the Development of Low Cadmium Rice, 109 NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCI. 47 (2012), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/109/47/19166.full [https://perma
.cc/G57Y-JKJG].
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The question at issue is whether the national and international
instruments we have now yield effective protection for, and sustain inno-
vation in, the research programs that support food security. In the next
section, we will explore the international conventions and enabling stat-
utes with this question in mind.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL IPR LANDSCAPE IN AGRICULTURE
Patent laws are not the only protections governing IPRs in plants
at both the national and the international level; there are also statutes
and international instruments providing protection for plant varieties.79
These schemes differ from patent regimes in important ways. Plant
variety protections are much less costly to obtain than patents. Applica-
tions for such protections, for example, need not demonstrate any kind
of potential for utility or industrial application;80 nor need they fulfil the
extensive obligations of description and disclosure required for patents.81
Perhaps most importantly, there are exemptions to these protections that
relate to food security.82 Examining the relevant legislative instruments
and their interaction with patent law will help make prominent the ways
in which food security concerns express themselves through IPRs.
A. Plant Variety Protection
1. Breeders’ Rights and Their Exemptions
Available to plant breeders in many countries, plant variety
protections (“PVPs”) provide a form of protection for the fruits of crop
plant R&D. Although the International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants has many members (all of whom are signatories to the
UPOV convention on plant varieties),83 this section will focus on the
79 See generally Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and
Fury. . .?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 727 (2002).
80 Although the uniformity and stability requirements allude to commercial acceptability
in the various PVP acts described in this section, actual utility is not necessary for a
certificate to be granted. Compare this with the regime governing patents: 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101–103, and the European Patent Convention arts. 54, 56, and 57.
81 Janis & Kesan, supra note 79, at 730.
82 See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 8,
Jan. 1, 1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 300.
83 See Members of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,
UPOV (2014), http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/pub423.pdf [https://
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contrasting approaches to PVPs in the European Union and the United
States, as this comparison will highlight the potential for a multilayered
approach to IPRs in plant varieties and the effects relevant to our discus-
sion of food security.
Article 1 of UPOV provides the following definition of plant variety:
“variety” means a plant grouping within a single botanical
taxon of the lowest known rank, which grouping, irrespec-
tive of whether the conditions for the grant of a breeder’s
right are fully met, can be:
—defined by the expression of the characteristics resulting
from a given genotype or combination of genotypes,
—distinguished from any other plant grouping by the
expression of at least one of the said characteristics and
—considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for
being propagated unchanged . . .84
As signatories to UPOV, the EU and the United States have each estab-
lished similar laws that specifically provide for the governance of PVPs.85
The United States has provided for twenty-year terms of protection for
plants,86 and the EU has opted for twenty-five.87 Both will grant such
protection upon demonstration of distinctiveness, uniformity, stability,
perma.cc/HU3R-C7YQ]; International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants, 815 U.N.T.S. 11609 (1968) [hereinafter UPOV]. This convention has been revised
several times, in 1961, 1972, 1978, and 1991. See also UPOV, at arts 5–6. Not all signato-
ries are bound to the latest revision, which extended the terms of protection and formal-
ized the requirements for grant of protection, including the introduction of novelty as a
requirement. UPOV also introduced the idea of an essentially derived variety, which was
then adopted into legislation in the United States and the European Union. The United
States and European Union are both bound to the latest revision.
84 See UPOV, supra note 83, at art. 1(vi).
85 See EC, Council Regulation (EC) 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 (on community plant variety
rights) (amended by council regulation (EC) 2506/95 of 25 October 1995; [1994] OJ L
227/1 [hereinafter ECPVR]; and the Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2321 (1970)
[hereinafter PVPA]). It must be borne in mind that the PVPA was brought into alignment
with the provisions of UPOV in 1994.
86 See PVPA, supra note 85, at § 83(b)(1).
87 See ECPVR, supra note 85, at § 19(1).
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and novelty,88 and extend that protection beyond the protected variety to
any “essentially derived” variety.89 The grants may be given whether the
variety applied for was deliberately pursued or discovered and subse-
quently developed,90 and give the grant holder exclusive rights over the
production, conditioning, sale, import, and export of both seeds and the
fruits of harvest.91
Although they appear at first glance to offer protections similar to
those of patents, these enabling statutes and UPOV provide several exemp-
tions, all of which might be regarded as being concerned with food security.
The first is an option for states to restrict breeders’ rights in the
public interest. UPOV’s laconic expression92 of this option stands in con-
trast to the elaborations articulated in the ECPVR93 and the PVPA,94 but
the thrust is similar. Although the United States and the EU allow the
state to trench on breeders’ rights to different degrees, if it is in the pub-
lic interest, the government may override the breeder’s right to exclude
others as long as equitable remuneration is provided to the breeder (for
example, through compulsory licensing).95
A second exemption, which is compulsory,96 protects the right of
breeders to use a protected variety for the purpose of breeding new varie-
ties: a PVP version of the research exemption that sometimes accompa-
nies the legislation for patent regimes.97
A third exemption protects the right of farmers to save seeds for
the propagation of crops on their own land, whether for their own pur-
poses or for sale as a crop. Sale or exchange of seed for the purpose of
propagation, however, requires authorization from the breeder.98 In the
EU, this exemption is directed at small farms; seed saving farmers must
88 Id. at arts. 7–10; PVPA, supra note 85, at § 42(a).
89 See ECPVR, supra note 85, arts. 13(5)–(6); PVPA, supra note 85, at § 41(a).
90 See ECPVR, supra note 85, at art. 11(1); PVPA, supra note 85, at § 97(2) (Definitions);
UPOV, supra note 83, at art. 1(iv).
91 See ECPVR, supra note 85, art 13(2); see also PVPA, supra note 85, at § 111(a).
92 See UPOV, supra note 83, at art. 17.
93 See ECPVR, supra note 85, at art. 29.
94 See PVPA, supra note 85, at § 44.
95 See ECPVR, supra note 85; see also PVPA, supra note 85.
96 See UPOV, supra note 83, at art. 15(1).
97 See PVPA, supra note 85, at § 114; ECPVR, supra note 85, at art. 15(b)–(c).
98 See UPOV, supra note 83, at art. 15; PVPA, supra note 85, at § 113; ECPVR, supra note
85, at art. 14. Prior to 1994, the PVPA included a sale exemption for farmers, which
exemption was clarified and defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995). That protection was eliminated in 1994 when the PVPA
was amended in order to align it with the 1991 version of the UPOV.
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provide “equitable remuneration” to the breeder if the annual production
of their farm exceeds ninety-two tonnes of cereals.99 Although this farmer’s
exemption is now enshrined in the PVPA and the ECPVR, UPOV leaves
it as optional.100
2. Traditional Practices: Limited Protection
The farmer’s exemption in UPOV, the PVPA and the ECPVR can
be read as having been put into place in order to safeguard traditional
seed saving practices, and, by extension, agricultural production.101 But
by making protection of breeder’s rights mandatory while simultaneously
curtailing the traditional practices of farming communities and making
the agreement’s residual protection of those same practices merely op-
tional, UPOV appears skewed towards protecting the activities of breed-
ers over those of farmers. This has drawn criticism from some quarters.102
In this connection, these acts have also been criticized for essen-
tially turning what was originally a fairly limited right for breeders to
control the commercial sale of varieties they had developed into a much
more extensive form of appropriation akin to the protections afforded
through patents.103 It is likely that part of the pressure to extend the rights
of breeders under UPOV and the national legislation adopting its provi-
sions may have derived from conventional seed producers concerned about
the protections afforded to companies such as Monsanto, whose modifica-
tions to seed were covered by patent.104 The introduction of protection for
essentially derived varieties in the 1991 revision of UPOV, for example,
99 See ECPVR, supra note 85, at art. 14(3); UPOV, supra note 83, at art. 15(2). The UPOV
appears to leave the matter of remuneration open, or at least open to interpretation, when
it mentions protection of the breeder’s legitimate interests in this connection. See UPOV,
supra note 83, art. 15(2). The United States appears to have interpreted the UPOV as per-
mitting no remuneration, as the PVPA seems to leave seed-saving practices unrestricted.
100 See UPOV, supra note 83, art. 15(2).
101 ECPVR, supra note 85, art. 14.
102 See Alvaro Toledo, Saving the Seed: Europe’s Challenge, GRAIN (Apr. 25, 2002), http://
www.grain.org/article/entries/224-saving-the-seed-europe-s-challenge [https://perma.cc
/RT45-GS9J].
103 Silechi Bedasie, The Possible Overlap Between Plant Variety Protection And Patent:
Approaches in Africa with Particular Reference to South Africa and Ethiopia, 1 Haramaya
L. Rev. 125, 131 (2012) (describing the “absence of a clear delineation between the scopes
of the relevant laws.”).
104 See The End of Farm-Saved Seed? Industry’s Wish List for the Next Revision of UPOV,
GRAIN (Feb. 16, 2007) [hereinafter The End of Farm-Saved Seed?], http://www.grain.org
/article/entries/58-the-end-of-farm-saved-seed-industry-s-wish-list-for-the-next-revision
-of-upov [https://perma.cc/GK4T-M435].
2016] PRODUCTIVITY AND DIVERSITY 869
may have been motivated by a desire to prevent biotech developers from
claiming control over a variety simply by inserting a new gene into the
propagating material.105
That does not explain, however, why breeder’s rights seem to take
precedence over the protection of traditional farming practices such as
seed exchange. That question can be answered by understanding that one
general function of the various IPR regimes with respect to the different
research programs is to spread risk.
3. Spreading Risk
As mentioned above, the dominant narrative of IPRs assumes
that providing limited monopolies for the fruits of research will create in-
centive for continued innovation in these areas.106 This rationale seems
especially well-suited to those areas of research which require significant
capital investments or carry significant risk, such as genetic modification.
Less clearly motivated is the fairly powerful, patent-like protection
given to conventional breeders through instruments that follow the model
of UPOV. Commercial plant breeding is indeed expensive, but it is expen-
sive in part because of the long timescales on which it operates,107 relative
to the timescales needed for modification through genetic engineering.108
This leads to a puzzle: by providing protection to conventional plant breed-
ing efforts, legislators are effectively encouraging market allocation of
resources towards a research program that is less efficient than another
with similar research targets (i.e., increasing crop yield).
One explanation for such support is that the protection of the
interests of conventional breeders serves a risk-spreading function.109
Recall the discussion of Section I concerning the risk profiles associated
with each methodological approach to improving crop productivity.110
105 Id.
106 See generally Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
107 See The UPOV System of Plant Variety Protection, INT’L UNION FOR PROT. NEW
VARIETIES PLANTS (2011), http://www.upov.int/about/en/upov_system.html [https://perma
.cc/W5YF-4NN9].
108 See Pocket K, supra note 25.
109 See generally UPOV, supra note 83; cf. Pocket K, supra note 25 (comparing the risks
and benefits of traditional breeding and genetic modification).
110 See generally Garry Peterson et al., The Risks and Benefits of Genetically Modified
Crops: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y (Mar. 27, 2000), http://www.ecol
ogyandsociety.org/vol4/iss1/art13/#AssessingTheRisksAndBenefitsOfGmCrops [https://
perma.cc/793P-Q5XP].
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While genetic engineering provides, by current estimates, the most likely
path to staying ahead of the Malthusian curve, it is a path fraught with
uncertainty.111 Modern commercial breeding methods do involve some rad-
ical methods for inducing mutations.112 However, even radiation-induced
mutation of a natural plant genome is more likely to produce incremental
variation113 than the kind of transformative leap that introduction of a
gene from another species—or even another kingdom—makes possible.114
Since the long-term effects of genetic engineering on crop plants are not
known, it makes sense to cultivate legislative protection for a parallel
system: one that has significant drawbacks affecting its efficiency, but
whose long track record and incremental methods offer a relatively high
degree of comfort.115
By the same token, the exemptions granted to farmers may be
regarded as providing some protection for that informal research pro-
gram, in order to spread the risk even further. If modern commercial prac-
tice pushes the envelope of conventional breeding through irradiative
techniques, farmers cross-pollinating crop plants on their fields employ
no such methods; it is the most conservative of the three research pro-
grams under consideration. The weakness of those exemptions, however,
signals the relative importance of such traditional practices in the eyes
of legislators.
Indeed, the relative strength of the different protections—patent,
PVP, and farmer exemptions—can be viewed as marking the relative value
that legislators place on the three programs in general. If there are any
trends to be spotted here, it bears mentioning that UPOV has progres-
sively strengthened its protections for plant varieties through its several
iterations.116 While some of that strengthening might be traceable to a
breeder lobby interested in shielding its rent collection mechanisms, in
111 M. Solem et al., Malthusian Theory of Population, AAG CENTER FOR GLOBAL GEOGRAPHY
EDUC. (Sept. 18, 2011), http://cgge.aag.org/PopulationandNaturalResources1e/CF_Pop
NatRes_Jan10/CF_PopNatRes_Jan108.html [https://perma.cc/QLL4-AZX7].
112 See Peterson et al., supra note 110.
113 See Johnson, supra note 20.
114 See Nancy Moran & Tyler Jarvik, Lateral Transfer of Genes from Fungi Underlies
Carotenoid Production in Aphids, 328 SCIENCE 624, 624–27 (2010), available at http://sci
ence.sciencemag.org/content/328/5978/624 [https://perma.cc/C7K5-VBYY] (noting that the
concern here is with the unpredictable effects of joining genes from radically different
organisms, not whether such joining is “natural” or “unnatural,” while interspecies gene
transfer is itself a natural phenomenon).
115 See Batista et al., supra note 24 (discussing that farmers cross-pollinating crop plants
on their fields employ no such methods).
116 See The End of Farm-Saved Seed?, supra note 104.
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light of the discussion above, it might be said that it also represents an
increasing interest on the part of legislators to spread risk by encouraging
investment in commercial breeding.117
B. Patent Protections for Plant Varieties
The risk-spreading rationale discussed above can be extended to
help explain the differential approach between the United States and the
EU with respect to patenting plant varieties.
1. United States
The United States permits patenting of plant varieties.118 The
scope of patent protection for plants is just as long as that provided for
in the PVPA.119 Where the PVPA covers only sexually reproducing plants
and tubers120 and maintains a focus on propagating and harvested mate-
rial, patents can be granted for plants or parts of plants including seeds
and pollen, as well as for methods used to produce the varieties.
For those varietal forms already covered by the PVPA, patenting
provides stronger protection.121 Although the original understanding of
the PVPA, in relation to the Patent Act, may have been that the two offered
mutually exclusive protective regimes, the possibility of applying for both
a PVPA certificate and a utility patent arose in the wake of the decision
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty122 and was conclusively confirmed in J.E.M.
AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.123
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the Patent Act con-
tains none of the exemptions for farmers or breeders that the PVPA ar-
ticulates. Although there are statutory research exemptions in the Patent
Act,124 these have not been construed as offering any protection for breeding
117 Id.
118 General Information About 35 U.S.C. 161 Plant Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-appli
cations/general-information-about-35-usc-161 [https://perma.cc/XV9W-4FWX] (last visited
Mar. 27, 2016).
119 Id.
120 See Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2401 (1970).
121 See The End of the Farm-Saved Seed?, supra note 104.
122 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319–22 (1980).
123 J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145–
47 (2001).
124 See Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205–08 (2005) (explain-
ing the research exemptions under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
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research.125 Moreover, there is no public interest exemption and no cov-
erage whatsoever for the traditional seed-saving or exchange practices
of farmers.126 In consequence, if a patent is held on a plant variety, the
exemptions of the PVPA do not apply—whether or not a PVPA certificate
is also held on that same variety.
2. EU
In sharp contrast to the American model, plant varieties are ex-
pressly denied patent protection under the European Patent Convention:
53. European patents shall not be granted in respect of:
. . .
(b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological pro-
cesses for the production of plants or animals; this provi-
sion does not apply to microbiological processes or the
products thereof.127
The reference to “essentially biological processes” in the context of the
EPC is intended to exclude from patentability the process of “crossing or
selection,”128 or in other words, conventional breeding processes. These
exclusions are replicated in the context of the EU’s Biotechnology Direc-
tive at article 4(1)(a) and (b);129 the same directive, however, provides
that isolated plant biological materials and plant-related technologies
are patentable:
125 See Chris Holman, District Court Rejects Argument that Hatch-Waxman Safe Harbor
Applies to Genetically Modified Crops, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (Nov. 29, 2012), http://
holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.ca/2012/11/district-court-rejects-argument-that.html
[https://perma.cc/MT78-YVJH] (explaining the holding that the patented genetic material
used in research counted as a “food additive” and thereby fell within the scope of 35
U.S.C. 271(e)(1)).
126 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2010) (outlining the patent exemptions in the code).
127 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) art.
53(b), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter EPC].
128 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on
the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art. 2, 1998 O.J. (L 213/13) [hereinafter
Biotechnology Directive].
129 Id. at art. 4.
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Article 3
. . .
2. Biological material which is isolated from its natural
environment or produced by means of a technical process
may be the subject of an invention even if it previously
occurred in nature.
. . .
Article 4
. . .
2. Inventions which concern plants or animals shall be
patentable if the technical feasibility of the invention is
not confined to a particular plant or animal variety.130
By providing such protections, the EU allows for patenting of discoveries
relating to genetic modification: an isolated gene, for example, may be
patented (for a particular purpose), and inserted into different plant
varieties in order to encourage expression of a desired trait.131
3. Accounting for Asymmetries
The asymmetry between the protective regimes in the EU and the
United States can be connected to regional history and the effect of such
history on the evaluation of risk.
130 Id. at art. 3(2), 4(2).
131 It bears mentioning that the Biotechnology Directive at article 4(2) appears to leave
open the possibility of patenting varieties, because the introduction of such a patented
gene into a plant or into plant propagating material will effectively extend patent protec-
tion to the genetically modified organism. The European Patent Office addressed this in
their decision regarding Transgenic Plant / Novartis II. The upshot of the decision was that
claiming a patent over a transgenic plant was not a claim upon the genetics of the plant
as a whole: the claimed transgenic plants were defined by characteristics which were ex-
pressions of the foreign genes. See Michael Blakeney, Patenting of Plant Varieties and Plant
Breeding Methods, 63 J. EXPERIMENTAL BOTANY 1069, 1070–71 (2012). Note however that
the patent was directed at the genes, not their expression (breeding a derivative variety
of plant that contained the gene but had suppressed its expression would still be in-
fringing). Because several plants could be defined in the same way, the claim was not for
a plant variety (nor several plant varieties).
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The EU’s careful exclusion of plant varieties from the strong pro-
tections afforded patents may be a function of Europe’s experiences in the
twentieth century. From the time of its early origins as an economic coop-
eration zone, the EU has maintained a longstanding preoccupation with
food security as well as political and economic stability.132 It addressed
these concerns, in part, with legal and economic institutional structures
designed to lower the risk of disruption in food supply. Large subsidies
flowing through the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, for example, guar-
anteed food surpluses and low prices.133
It might be argued that a corollary of this sensitivity to food
security is a legislative tendency to encourage the spread of investment
into crop improvement R&D across traditional methods as well as the
sophisticated methods of commercial breeding and genetic engineering.
The legislative fabric of PVPs and patents in the EU shelters, through its
exemptions, is a residue of traditional practices such as seed-saving and
farmer-initiated private breeding.134 That these protections exist, how-
ever weak they may be, maximizes the spread of risk and thereby aligns
with the EU’s generally risk-averse approach to food security.
The United States, which has never faced any significant food
security issues, appears to take a more sanguine view.135 By laying the
foundations for patent protection of plant varieties in legislation and juris-
prudence, its legislative regimes provide more scope for locking down the
experimental use of plant varieties at the expense of traditional practices,
narrowing support to research programs with greater efficiency than tra-
ditional practices but with higher risk profiles as well.136
While the United States provides for some statutory exemptions
to the protections provided by the Patent Act (aimed at products subject
to regulation by the FDA),137 and there is a residual, extremely narrow
common-law research exemption for curious amateurs, there are no
132 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), EUROPEAN CROP PROT., http://www.ecpa.eu/infor
mation-page/agriculture-today/common-agricultural-policy-cap [https://perma.cc/GLE5
-H58X] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
133 Id.
134 At least with their own seeds or seeds they have purchased legitimately under the
terms of the ECPVR. Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community
Plant Variety Rights, O.J. (L 227) 1, 2, 8.
135 David Bennet, U.S. Seed Law History: a Primer, DELTA FARM PRESS (Mar. 2, 2006),
http://deltafarmpress.com/us-seed-law-history-primer [https://perma.cc/KK3H-45NQ].
136 Id.
137 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2010) (outlining the patent exemptions in the code).
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exemptions directed at commercial research and development of plant
varieties.138 A plant breeder who chooses to patent his/her variety can ex-
clude others from its use, not only in rival commercial research programs,139
but for any breeding use that is directed at a commercial purpose. This
could include local breeding experiments conducted by farmers on their
own farms, which experiments have traditionally been undertaken not
only to improve crop yields but also in order to produce seed that could
be sold at seed exchanges.
In effectively abandoning support for these practices, the United
States is displaying a greater appetite for risk than the EU. The United
States is still spreading risk to some extent, however, by encouraging al-
location of resources across the two higher risk/higher reward approaches
furnished by commercial breeding and genetic engineering.
C. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights
Apart from UPOV, its statutory counterparts, and national patent
legislation, there is one other significant instrument governing IPRs in
plants and therefore influencing the several research programs we have
been discussing: the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs).140
For our purposes, the importance of TRIPs arises from the flexi-
bilities it allows with respect to the implementation of PVPs and its en-
dorsement of patent protection for transgenics. Article 27(3)(b) states that:
Members may also exclude from patentability: plants and
animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially bio-
logical processes for the production of plants or animals
other than non-biological and microbiological processes.
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant
varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis
system or by any combination thereof.141
138 GIANCARLO MOSCHINI & OLEG YEROKHIN, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY: SEEDS OF CHANGE 190–94 (CAB International, 2007).
139 Id. at 191, 193–94.
140 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 1, Jan. 1,
1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 300 [hereinafter TRIPs].
141 Id. at art. 27(3)(b).
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As can be seen, the Article expressly provides that non-biological and
microbiological processes may not be excluded from patentability, thereby
ensuring patent protection for genetic modifications to plants produced
through biolistic or agrobacterium-mediated gene insertion.
To the extent that the agreement requires protection for plant
varieties in some form, member states need not adopt UPOV; they may
fashion their own sui generis142 systems from scratch. The sui generis op-
tion does not expressly constrain member states to enact legislation that
protects breeders’ rights as those are contemplated in such instruments
as UPOV.143 The language in TRIPs framing the obligation to enact PVPs
is extremely broad; even if it requires the protection of the rights of breed-
ers, the structure of those rights and the exemptions to them can be quite
different to those provided for in UPOV.144 Because the provisions of UPOV
favour commercial breeding over traditional practices, developing coun-
tries still crafting national legislative responses to their obligations under
TRIPs may find that the sui generis option is worth a close look.145
The foregoing discussion has focused on the United States and the
EU in order to illustrate the ways in which the IPRs for plant varieties,
transgenics, and traditional methods intertwine, and to demonstrate how
the tenor and force of the national instruments can be linked to regional
food security concerns.
The current regimes in IPRs for crop research and development
show a global tendency to support genetic modification over conventional
breeding and traditional practices. There is nonetheless a clear desire,
albeit unevenly expressed, to promote both conventional and traditional
methods. As we noted, however, there is a tension between breeders’
rights and farmers’ rights with respect to plant varieties, and the legisla-
tive instruments examined here both express that tension and signal the
local policy perspective on the value of those respective rights.
142 Janis & Kesan, supra note 79, at 739.
143 See Philippe Cullet & Radhika Koluru, Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights:
Towards a Broader Understanding, 24 DELHI L. REV. 41, 47–49 (2003).
144 See id. at 45.
145 The implementation of plant variety protection may need to be adjusted even in those
countries that have already enacted legislation in order to fulfill new obligations arising
from other international instruments, such as the Convention on Biodiversity or the
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, which promote
the protection of traditional practices and the rights of farmers (in opposition to those of
breeders). The current implementation of the general framework of the UPOV through
the PVPA and the ECPVR, for example, may not be in harmony with the requirements
arising from commitment to these other international instruments. See id. at 47–49, 54.
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D. Transgenic Patents, Traditional Methods, and Terminators
There is tension between patent rights for transgenic crops and
farmers’ rights as well. In the United States and the EU, the companies
holding patents on transgenic plant technologies vigorously enforce their
rights when these come into conflict with farming practices.146
The courts adjudicating such matters have frequently made
findings that favour the patent holders.147 The narrative of providing in-
centives for innovation is usually invoked in support of these findings.
There is one extremely powerful rationale, however, that will likely
continue to encourage judicial support of transgenic patent holders for
the foreseeable future, and one that goes directly to the heart of food
security: the availability of genetic use restriction technology, colloquially
known as “terminator” technology. In essence, the technology allows for
the control of plant fertility or longevity (e.g., by creating plants that
produce sterile seeds).148 This technology has been developed by several
companies,149 with Monsanto holding several key patents.150
To date, no one has commercialized it. There is profound opposi-
tion to the idea in the developing world: both India and Brazil have
passed national laws prohibiting the technology.151 The UN Convention
146 As illustrated by the three largest agri-biotech companies: Monsanto, Dupont Pioneer,
and Syngenta. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc.
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001); Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial,
Pioneer Hi Bred Int’l v. Does 1–5, No. 5:12-cv-06046-DGK (W.D. Mo. filed May 11, 2012);
Donald Zuhn, Monsanto and Syngenta Settle All Litigation Between the Companies,
PATENT DOCS (May 30, 2008), http://www.patentdocs.org/2008/05/monsanto-and-sy.html
[https://perma.cc/PFG6-QDYG].
147 See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1762; J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 595. For further
illustration, but in the Canadian context, see also Monsanto Canada Inc. v Schmeiser,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
148 HUGH WARWICK, GENEWATCH.ORG, SYNGENTA—SWITCHING OFF FARMERS’ RIGHTS? 7
(Oct. 2000), available at http://www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483
c1c3d49e4/syngenta.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QF6-LUA7].
149 See Context of ‘1994 and after: Biotech Companies Obtain Patents on Genetic Use
Restriction Technologies (GURT)’, HISTORY COMMONS, http://www.historycommons.org
/context.jsp?item=gm-161#gm-161 [https://perma.cc/AF5M-DDDZ]. (Companies having
developed this technology include Novartis, AstraZeneca, Monsanto, Pioneer Hi-Bred,
Rhone Poulenc, and DuPont).
150 See WARWICK, supra note 148, at 14–15; see also Monsanto Company History, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/pages/monsanto-history.aspx [https://perma.cc/8QAE
-N5FK] (several patents are held through the Delta and Pine Land Company it acquired
in 2007).
151 Haider Rizvi, Biodiversity: Don’t Sell ‘Suicide Seeds’, Activists Warn, INTER PRESS
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on Biological Diversity adopted a de facto moratorium on field-testing
and commercial sale of terminator-enabled seeds in 2000, reaffirming it
in 2006.152
If any technology is capable of introducing the future nightmare
of Bacigalupi’s novel, genetic use restriction is the most likely candidate
we have. Biotechnology companies that could profit from its deployment
seem to be content, for the moment, not to do so. But the incentive to in-
troduce terminator technology, and lobby against the creation of further
legislation banning its use, could quite easily grow out of unfavourable
court decisions or legislation that undermines the strength of patent pro-
tection. Bowman is a case in point: when the case was still under review
by the Supreme Court, concerns about the outcome included worries that
Monsanto might lift its self-imposed pledge not to commercialize its ter-
minator technology.153 Such worries are well-placed: because the business
model for agricultural biotechnology is built upon strong patent protec-
tion, weakening that protection would force companies to seek other ways
of shielding their market.
Deploying such technology could have disastrous consequences for
food security. For example, for those countries with no local high-yield
seed-producing companies that could be controlled through state action,
terminator technology on imported high-yield seed would unacceptably
compromise food sovereignty. It is no response to say that if a company
introduced such technology into its seed products, farmers could simply
decide not to buy that product. Competitive market pressure will natu-
rally increase the uptake of seed for high-yield crops in any given region.
Introducing a ban on the importation or use of genetically modified seed,
even if it were feasible in the short term, is unlikely to furnish a long
term solution. If the only way to assure a quantity of output sufficient to
match increasing national food supply needs were to buy a transgenic
seed with terminator technology, such a ban would be unsustainable.
Terminator technology would also undermine the effectiveness
of emergency measures such as compulsory low-cost licensing. The
SERV. NEWS AGENCY, (2006), http://www.ipsnews.net/2006/03/biodiversity-don’t-sell-suicide
-seeds-activists-warn/ [https://perma.cc/MJG6-RQ87].
152 See FIFTH ORDINARY MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION
ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, Decision V/5, III at 23 (May 2000); see also Moratorium, BAN
TERMINATOR, http://www.banterminator.org/Glossary/Moratorium [https://perma.cc/US4L
-KLBM].
153 Heidi Ledford, Seed-patent Case in Supreme Court, 494 NATURE 289 (Feb. 2003),
available at http://www.nature.com/news/seed-patent-case-in-supreme-court-1.12445 [https://
perma.cc/8B9C-3ET7].
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introduction of compulsory licensing of a particular foreign producer’s
high-yield seed would be pointless if the producer’s seed stock already in
the country had been loaded with genetic use restriction technology, and
the foreign seed producer were unwilling to import more. At least with
the current array of fertile transgenic seed stocks, governments faced
with food security crises could legislate emergency suspension of IPRs
immediately and sort out equitable remuneration for the producers later.
I conclude that in any current contest between patents on trans-
genic plants and farmers’ rights to save or exchange seeds, farmers will
lose. In the absence of a globally enforceable ban on terminator technology,
courts and legislators are, I think, quite rightly willing to abandon the
protection of traditional practices where those compete with transgenic
seeds in particular.
This is not intended to suggest that the ever-enlarging market in
transgenic seed stock must spell the end of traditional practices. These
practices are supportable with the right adjustments to existing IPR re-
gimes. It is to a consideration of such adjustments that we will now turn.
V. IMPROVING THE LANDSCAPE
As mentioned at the outset, the national legislative choices made
by countries who are party to the various international agreements dis-
cussed above will have significant impact on the evolution of food secu-
rity, both from a national and a global perspective. The ideal would be a
regime that encourages, or at least does not interfere with, the formal and
informal research programs that between them contribute to increased
crop yield and biodiversity. As we have seen, the distribution of strong
IP protections (and specific exemptions from those protections) encour-
ages the distribution of research investment into strategies with different
risk profiles, but the support for biodiversity provided by such protections
as they are currently implemented is uncertain.
Some have argued that implementing strong, uniform intellectual
property protections may not be wise for all countries, developing coun-
tries in particular.154 Insofar as traditional farming practices contribute
to biodiversity, and developing countries rely on the robustness of such
practices (as opposed to industrial agriculture), the relatively weak sup-
port for farmers under UPOV and derivative statutes, and the absence
154 IP JUSTICE POLICY PAPER FOR THE WIPO DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, IP JUSTICE (June 2005),
available at http://ipjustice.org/WIPO/WIPO_DA_IP_Justice_Policy_Paper.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BPW9-LQ3Z].
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of such support under patent legislation, arguably harms the interests
of developing countries.
In this section, I will argue that some improvement on the current
regime may be possible. What will be proposed is not a total cure; as we
shall discuss, below, because there is no practical scope for adjustment
of the patent regime, there is therefore no scope for diminishing the
competition between transgenic plant research and traditional practices.
However, with respect to plant varieties, the existing tissue of agree-
ments and legislative instruments may permit stronger protections for
shorter terms.
These shorter terms might spur an accelerated cycle of innovation
for capital-intensive commercial breeding. The need to satisfy shareholder
demand for steady or increasing revenue streams requires a pipeline of
new products enjoying the protections of IPRs. Because of the underlying
mechanics of plant breeding, an accelerated cycle of innovation may act
as a proxy incentive for biodiversity. At the same time, an argument can
be made that the faster flow of new varieties into the public domain could
support traditional practices more effectively than weaker IPR protec-
tions coupled with longer terms.
We will canvass alternatives as we go; but if what is ultimately
needed in order to balance innovation and biodiversity is a mixture of
strong protections, suitably distributed, and shorter terms, the question
then becomes: is it possible to work within the existing framework to
achieve this goal or a suitable proxy for it? In the final discussion on
utility models, I argue that the answer is yes.
A. Shortening the Term of Protection
Prior to the enticements offered by WTO membership, states
designed domestic intellectual property law to suit their economic cir-
cumstances, and ensured that the international agreements they were
negotiating left them the flexibility to do so.155 With the advent of TRIPs,
that flexibility has been diminished.
When TRIPs was first signed, twenty-year terms had already
become a de facto standard for patent protection in many jurisdictions.
The migration of that standard into the international agreement156 was
155 PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 38 (2002).
156 See TRIPs, supra note 140, at art. 33.
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therefore predictable and might even seem rational, given that the goal
of TRIPs is the harmonization of IPR regimes worldwide.
However, from a broader perspective, the uniformity of the twenty-
year patent term is difficult to justify—even if we were to assume that
the period was not chosen arbitrarily.157 One of the potential effects of
long patent terms is a decrease in the pace of innovation,158 especially in
capital-intensive research programs. Contentment with steady revenue
streams arising from existing patents may discourage shareholders in
corporations—who may have invested in order to bring those revenue
streams online—from maintaining corporate directors who themselves
support further extensive (and therefore expensive) R&D investment.159
One rational foundation for the choice of a particular patent term
length is the desire to strike a balance between the amount of investment
required and the time needed for recovery. Changes in market size, how-
ever, can result in serious distortions. A recent study that considered the
influence of market scale on the incentive to innovate, factoring in R&D
expenditures, population growth, and GDP per capita, concluded that as
market size increases, IP protection should be reduced—in the case of
patents, the optimal term being about ten years.160
This argument could be fairly applied to the current international
order in IPRs. It is true that TRIPs is not an international patent system
per se, but rather a harmonization instrument.161 The purpose of the
instrument, however, is to furnish at least some of the benefits that an
international system would provide; in particular, larger markets for
inventions.162 This is why ratification of TRIPs is compulsory for mem-
bership in the WTO: it is regarded as an instrument for the promotion of
157 See Reuven Brenner, Must All Patents Last for 20 Years?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2013,
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732450470457841315421221
8668 [https://perma.cc/9M4D-NGKV] (It is not clear to what extent we should assume
that the choice was reasoned. The first U.S. patents were 14 years in length. Congress
later extended them to 21 years; the term was later shortened to 17 years, which lasted
until 1999.).
158 See, e.g., Frank H. Alpert, An Analysis of Patent Length: Encouraging Innovation by
Shortening Patent Protection, 11 J. MACROMARKETING 40 (1991).
159 See, e.g., J. Bessen & R. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents (Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No 03-17, 2004).
160 Michele Boldren & David K. Levine, Market Size and Intellectual Property Protection,
50 INT’L ECON. REV. 855, 876 (2009).
161 See Cullet & Koluru, supra note 143, at 45 (describing minimum standards applied by
TRIPs to all member states).
162 Id. at 41.
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trade,163 providing for enforceable IPRs in new markets where rights
holders wish to sell their inventions, rather than as an instrument to
encourage invention. When coupled with devices such as the Patent
Cooperation Treaty,164 the national implementation of TRIPs require-
ments creates an efficient route to rapidly enlarging the market for a
given innovation.
As the market for an innovation enlarges, however, the rewards
enlarge as well, making recovery of investment more rapid. Uniformly
extending patent terms appropriate to national contexts into the global
context, where inventors can enlarge their markets by filing foreign
patents everywhere that TRIPs-compliant provisions are in force, is
therefore difficult to justify.
Shorter patent terms, however, will not make sense in all cases.
Taken in the aggregate, larger markets should lead to shorter terms
overall; but disaggregation of the data shows that different research pro-
grams have different optimal terms of protection. Pharmaceutical inno-
vations, for example, have high returns and high costs;165 this may be
contrasted with the software industry, where R&D costs can be vanish-
ingly small and the returns enormous.166 It is entirely possible that for
certain innovating sectors of industry, longer patent terms would be opti-
mal, and that for others the twenty-year current standard is close enough
to the relevant optimum.
For example, it may be beneficial to maintain the current patent
term for transgenic plant research. Anxieties about the safety of GM foods
in general—and, perhaps, hostility towards transgenic foods and the com-
panies that produce them in particular—have contributed to the creation
of a substantial regulatory burden for this sector in some jurisdictions.167
163 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION, ch. 7 (2000)
(In the United States, trade policy has been linked to maximization of intellectual prop-
erty privileges for several decades.).
164 See Patent Cooperation Treaty, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231 (1970) (The treaty provides a unified
application procedure for filing patents in each of its contracting states.) [hereinafter PCT].
165 Boldren & Levine, supra note 160, at 862.
166 See Joe Mullin, The Web’s Longest Nightmare Ends: Eolas’ patents are Dead on Appeal,
ARS TECHNICA (2013), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/08/microsoft
-and-eolas-settle-ending-patent-battle-over-plug-ins-activex/ [https://perma.cc/Z4VD-ZLSW]
(One admittedly egregious example: the Eolas patent on the “interactive web,” for which
the patent holder originally won a $540 million U.S.D. jury verdict.).
167 See Diahanna Lynch & David Vogel, The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the United
States: A Case-Study of Contemporary European Regulatory Politics, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (2001), http://www.cfr.org/agricultural-policy/regulation-gmos-europe-united
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It has been estimated that, in Europe, regulatory clearance absorbs ap-
proximately half of the R&D investment in any given transgenic crop
plant.168 Moreover, the biosafety assessment portion of regulatory compli-
ance accounts for only a fraction of the total, and as was pointed out
earlier, current biosafety regimes leave a lot to be desired in terms of the
depth of investigation that transgenics arguably warrant.169 The regula-
tory burden will likely continue to increase, especially if dependence on
the high yields of transgenic crops becomes more widespread and more
closely tied to food security as opposed to profit.
As the transgenic research program matures and its long-term
outcomes become better understood, the regulatory environment will set-
tle and the sector’s economic fortunes will become more predictable. At
that point, it may be worth considering whether the length of the current
patent term in this sector is defensible. At present, however, high exist-
ing R&D costs and uncertainty about the future character of the regu-
latory burden and its associated costs present a strong argument against
tinkering with either the length of the patent term or the strength of
patent protections for transgenics.
In concluding, it bears mentioning that the probability of turning
the international ship towards shorter patent terms is vanishingly small.
There are, among other factors, far too many vested interests that benefit
from the current terms. Hence, while it is interesting to contemplate the
social benefits of shorter patent terms from a policy perspective, the like-
lihood is that the terms embedded in TRIPs will become more, and not
less, entrenched.
B. Compulsory Licensing
If circumstances require it, international negotiations may be held
to modify the extent or rigidity of TRIPs obligations. This has happened
before: the WTO Ministerial Conference of November 2001, held in Doha,
adopted an interpretative statement entitled the Declaration on the TRIPs
Agreement and Public Health,170 reaffirming “the flexibility of TRIPs
-states-case-study-contemporary-european-regulatory-politics/p8688 [https://perma.cc
/GTE9-S2D9].
168 See Willy De Greef, GM Crops: The Crushing Cost of Regulation, AGBIOWORLD (2011)
http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/crushingcost.html [https://perma
.cc/VWT3-7PSP] (This can amount to millions of dollars in each case.).
169 See Kuiper et al., supra note 45.
170 WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (adopted Nov. 14, 2001), available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe
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member states in circumventing patent rights for better access to essential
medicines.”171 This interpretative statement was later strengthened into
an amendment allowing WTO members to enact legislation for compulsory
licenses for generic versions of patented medicines, but its future success
is uncertain; as of this time, only forty-five countries have accepted it.172
In the event of a food security crisis arising from crop failures, it
is possible that a future round of WTO talks could adopt a similar decla-
ration directed at compulsory licensing for patented transgenic plants or
plant varieties for member states who consider their food security to be at
risk from climate change or changing ecosystem disease profiles, further
leveraging article 8 of TRIPs:
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and tech-
nological development, provided that such measures are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.173
Compulsory licensing may have deleterious effects on biodiversity, how-
ever. The long term effects of compulsory licensing as a prophylactic mea-
sure against a perceived food security threat could increase a tendency
to monoculture, and thereby risk destabilizing crop yields catastrophi-
cally in the future. The possibility of such outcomes may be increased
where a country adopting such compulsory licensing legislation on terms
favourable to farmers was adjacent to a country without such legislation.
The potential market differentials between such neighbors could encour-
age farmers to cultivate the cheaply licensed high-yield crop varieties to
a greater extent than the government intended: the surplus would fetch
a profit on foreign regional markets. Hence such compulsory licensing
/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=35625,33346,313
35,18756,37246,35766,37254,17243,35772,37509&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=5&FullText
Search= [https://perma.cc/C8M2-CSU4] [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
171 Id.
172 Members accepting amendment of the TRIPs Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm [https://perma.cc/8EEF-ZQRJ]
(last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (The quorum for formal incorporation of the amendment is
two-thirds of the 153 members of the WTO, and the deadline for adoption (extended
twice) is presently set to expire on December 31 2017.).
173 TRIPs, supra note 140, at art. 8; see also TRIPs, supra note 140, at art. 27(2)–(3).
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regimes, even if they were available, would only be a partial solution best
deployed in urgent circumstances.
C. Weakening Protections
An alternative strategy would be to weaken the potency of TRIPs-
compliant statutory schemes with respect to plant varieties in particular.
Because TRIPs permits the possibility of enacting sui generis protections
for plant varieties, one possibility would be to enact a national version of
UPOV that takes full advantage of the optional exemptions provided for
farmers: allowing them, as the PVPA does, to save and reuse seeds from
year to year, without having to remunerate commercial breeders. This
would permit farmers to perform their own local breeding experiments
with different breeds they purchase under license, even though the fruits
of those experiments would be restricted to their private use. This could
provide some level of localized support for biodiversity by assisting the
creation of a reserve (albeit atomized) of different essentially derived va-
rieties. That could then be leveraged in the face of any regional food secu-
rity issues arising from changing conditions in local ecosystems, through
subsequent compulsory licensing of those varieties with royalty rates
favourable to farmers.174
As noted above, however, the informal research program furnished
by traditional practice is relatively inefficient, and its efficiency is further
curtailed by UPOV’s mandatory restriction on exchange of seeds covered
by PVP and the protection of essentially derived varieties. To pin all hope
of promoting biodiversity on this form of research would be unwise. It is
highly unlikely that the rate at which new varieties would be generated
by this method will substantially contribute to the stability of food supply
needed to cope with rising global demand curves, to say nothing of the
need for increased crop productivity.
The weakening of existing protections is a strategy with potential
long-term payoff, but our present situation needs short-to-medium-term
solutions. In addition, this strategy would have at least some negative
impact on investment in commercial breeding, by diminishing repeat sales
of plant varieties protected under such relaxed UPOV-style legislation.
Any such reduction in investment on commercial breeding will undermine
174 In order to be effective, this suggestion would need to be accompanied by an exclusionary
legislative regime such as that adopted by the EU, whereby plant varieties are excluded
from the statutory protections afforded by patents.
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the increased-yield plant varieties that such breeding aims at, sacrificing
productivity improvements for biodiversity.
D. Alternative Protections for Plant Varieties: The Utility Model
TRIPs compliance requires maintenance of lengthy patent terms,
and exploiting the flexibilities of UPOV and TRIPs alone in service of
supporting farmers’ rights is unlikely to yield the kinds of benefits we
need in the near term. However, when combined with utility models as
outlined below, a weakened form of the existing framework has the po-
tential to alter incentives for commercial breeding research programmes
in ways beneficial to biodiversity.
1. Utility Models
Utility models are similar to patents, but the conditions under
which they are granted are considerably less strict.175 The offices examin-
ing utility model requests do not conduct thorough examinations as they
would for standard patents, often granting the utility model if the appli-
cation complies with formalities.176 Most importantly, utility model pro-
tection typically extends to a much shorter term than patents, ranging
between six and fifteen years depending on the jurisdiction,177 and is gen-
erally considered (where available) suitable for “incremental inventions”.178
Utility models have not been universally adopted, although they
are recognized under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property,179 and therefore under TRIPs by extension.180 There is, however,
no explicit mention of utility models within the body of TRIPs. In conse-
quence, the incorporation of the Paris Convention provisions leaves WTO
175 Protecting Innovations by Utility Models, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://
www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/utility_models/utility_models.htm [https://perma.cc
/2PMR-36AT].
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 1(2), July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (“The protection of indus-
trial property has as its object patents, utility models, industrial designs, trade marks . . .”
[emphasis added]).
180 See TRIPs, supra note 140, at art. 2(1).
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members free to define the scope and duration of protection under any
utility model laws they choose to enact.181
As it stands, most countries that have utility model legislation
expressly exclude plant and animal varieties;182 but there is no fundamen-
tal reason that such exclusions, where they do exist, could not be modi-
fied. In this respect, countries wishing to enact utility model legislation
that provides protection for plant varieties could exploit two known
features of utility models: that they are intended for protection of “incre-
mental” inventions, and that there is no international consensus on what
this means.183
The efforts of commercial breeders, it could be argued, fall within
the concept of incremental invention. The creation of new plant varieties
that exhibit a particular desirable trait, or a small collection of such traits,
could be construed as an incremental modification of a basic natural vari-
ety, or an incremental advance on a previously bred variety. Because of
the lack of consensus on what “incremental” amounts to generally, indi-
vidual jurisdictions would be free to decide what might be included as
protectable subject matter with respect to plant varieties within the con-
text of utility models.
2. Combining Utility Models with Weakened UPOV Protections
Crucially, because UPOV does not prohibit other forms of protection
for plant varieties—as the jurisprudence in the United States regarding
the patentability of plant varieties has shown—implementing a utility
model regime in parallel with UPOV-style legislation is clearly possible.
This introduces the potential for materially improving both support for
commercial breeding research and net biodiversity simultaneously.
For example, a strong utility model regime providing protection
for plant varieties but with no exemptions for farmers could be coupled
with the weakened UPOV regime described just above in section V.C. The
two regimes could include provisions excluding the exploitation of both
regimes in respect of a given innovation. Commercial breeders electing
to register a new plant variety under the utility model regime would
thereby forego the possibility of ever registering that variety under the
weakened UPOV regime.
181 UMA SUTHERSANEN ET AL., INNOVATION WITHOUT PATENTS: HARNESSING THE CREATIVE
SPIRIT IN A DIVERSE WORLD 21 (2007).
182 See The Consolidate Utility Models Act No. 1431 of 21 December 2005, art. 2(4).
183 See Suthersanen et al., supra note 181, at 18–20.
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It bears mentioning, at this point, that this proposal remains com-
patible with the text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.184 This compatibility
does not rely on the TPP’s recognition of the Doha Declaration or the
general right of parties to take measures to protect public health,185 and
exists in spite of the fact that the TPP did not import the TRIPs provision
for sui generis systems.186 The compatibility arises instead from the com-
mitment to ratify the 1991 version of UPOV by the local date of entry into
force of the TPP.187 As a result, any party to the TPP could fulfill its re-
quirements by adopting a maximally weakened version of UPOV’s pro-
tections for plant varieties as discussed above, and instituting in parallel
the utility model regime proposed here.
Suitably structured, such a regime would provide an incentive for
commercial breeders to prefer utility model protection for their innova-
tions. The strong protection could be extended to include protection for
essentially derived varieties, thereby providing the same safeguards of
the most recent version of UPOV, with the understanding that when the
protection for the initial variety expires, all essentially derived varieties
would thereby also be released into the public domain.
Assuming the foregoing, and assuming a fairly short term for
utility model protections for plant varieties (say, six years), the net effect
would be strong protection for a short term, permitting the products of
commercial breeding to enter the public domain rapidly. In consequence,
commercial breeders would have strong incentives to invest in the rapid
production of new varieties, and in particular varieties that escape the
designation “essentially derived,” so that these could be independently
protected and would continue to create revenue streams even as earlier
utility model protections expired. I venture to suggest that such an accel-
erated cycle of plant breeding would require experimentation with a wide
variety of input plants, thereby increasing biodiversity in the output.
Moreover, although the proposed utility model regime would pre-
vent seed saving and exchange for protected varieties, the rapid diffusion
of desirable plant varieties into the public domain might well help sustain
those traditional practices better than our current legislative framework.
184 See TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHAPTER, art. 18 (Feb. 2,
2016) [hereinafter TPP], available at https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership
/intellectual-property-3479efdc7adf#.vsmr7gvy6 [https://perma.cc/F7C3-P3GF].
185 See TPP, art. 18.6.
186 See, e.g., TPP, art. 18.37(4). The TPP provides only an exceptional option for New
Zealand. See TPP, Annex 18-A(1)(b).
187 See TPP, art. 18.7(2)(d). Except for New Zealand, see TPP, Annex 18-A(1)(b).
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If twenty-year protections preventing seed exchange are coupled with a
widespread desire to use protected seed products for such reasons as
yield or hardiness, the net effect could be a moratorium on seed saving
and exchange for the length of a human generation. By the time the pro-
tection has expired, moreover, it is very likely that the farmers will have
moved on to better seeds still under protection. A shorter term, such as
six years, might be short enough to maintain the traditional practices
within each generation and hence between generations as well.
It might be argued that providing strong, exceptionless protections
for commercial breeders would not offset the discouraging effects of the
short term of protection, and that the net result would therefore be a de-
cline in commercial breeding investment in general. Three arguments
may be made against this, however.
To begin with, if a commercial breeding enterprise of small-to-
medium size found that their revenue streams were too limited to sup-
port the amount of investment in R&D required to provide rapid output
of new varieties, they could form collaborations with other breeders in
order to pool resources. Failing the effectiveness of such cooperation,
some market consolidation might take place, as larger breeders might be
able to exploit economies of scale in their R&D investments.
Secondly, utility model protections may exploit the international
application framework provided by the PCT. Article 2(i) of the PCT states
that:
For the purposes of this Treaty and the Regulations
and unless expressly stated otherwise:
(i) “application” means an application for the protection
of an invention; references to an “application” shall be
construed as references to applications for patents for in-
ventions, inventors’ certificates, utility certificates, utility
models, patents or certificates of addition, inventors’ cer-
tificates of addition, and utility certificates of addition.188
When we couple the availability of this mechanism with the relatively low
burden imposed on application requirements for utility models in gen-
eral, the possibility for commercial breeders to secure an enlarged market
for their varieties at low cost may sufficiently offset the discouraging
188 PCT, supra note 164, at art. 2(i) [emphasis added].
890 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 40:849
effects of the short term of protection that their products would enjoy in
each jurisdiction. For this advantage to exist, however, would require
that several jurisdictions with markets of significant size adopt similar
utility model legislation, allowing for protection of plant varieties.
Finally, not all investors have the appetite for the high R&D costs,
fluctuating regulatory burdens, and substantial controversy that afflict
investments in transgenics, despite the potential for higher rewards. The
performance of commercial breeding companies is, for these reasons,
already somewhat more predictable and lower risk than their commercial
transgenic research counterparts. Strengthening protection for their prod-
ucts through utility models would add to that predictability and attract
investment from those who seek steady return.
Despite its several attractions, this proposal is not without its
drawbacks. Because utility models have lower thresholds on eligibility
for protection than patents, the use of utility models might facilitate
biopiracy. The Enola bean offers a case in point. In the mid-1990s, John
Proctor bought some mixed Phaseolus vulgaris beans in Mexico and
returned to the United States.189 He selected the yellow beans and grew
them into plants, harvested the result, and replanted for a few seasons.190
He then applied for, and received, a U.S. patent on Phaseolus vulgaris
beans having a particular shade of yellow in 1999.191
Having secured the patent, Proctor enforced it by demanding a 6-
cent-per-pound royalty on all importation of yellow Phaseolus vulgaris
beans into the United States.192 While the challenges to his patent wound
their way through the courts, his royalty remained enforceable and led
to a significant reduction of bean imports from Mexico.193 The patent was
ultimately defeated at the hands of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals,
which founded its decision on a finding that the patent claim was for
an obvious variation of a well-known yellow bean;194 but a substantial
amount of damage to Mexican bean farmers had already been done.
189 See Gillian N. Rattray, The Enola Bean Patent Controversy: Biopiracy, Novelty and
Fish-and-Chips, 1 DUKE L. & TECH REV. 1, 1–2 (2002).
190 Id.
191 Id.; see also Dennis Crouch, Mexican Yellow Bean Patent Finally Cooked, PATENTLYO
(July 10, 2009), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/07/mexican-yellow-bean-patent-finally
-cooked.html [https://perma.cc/FG9X-LTAC].
192 Crouch, supra note 191.
193 Rattray, supra note 189.
194 Phil Jones, Federal Circuits Cooks Bean Patent While Another Patent Dispute Simmers,
ISB NEWS REPORT (Feb. 2010), http://www.isb.vt.edu/news/2010/Feb/FederalCircuitsCooks
BeanPatentarticle.pdf [https://perma.cc/P88P-YSLK].
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Utility models as currently implemented have variable thresholds
for novelty, and weakness in this area could well translate into more
widespread exploitation of the protective regime on dubious grounds.
Even if the standards were made more stringent, the general rule that
sees utility models initially approved simply by fulfilling the formal steps
might lead to the kinds of market-distorting effects that Proctor’s illegiti-
mate patent created for a decade.
Adoption of utility models as a proxy for shorter patent terms,
therefore, may well require the application of a more stringent approval
process, and thresholds in line with those of standard patents. Neverthe-
less, in my view, suitable exploitation of utility models would offer a bet-
ter distribution of support for the three research programs discussed here
than could be achieved by weakened UPOV-style protections on their
own or, for that matter, the status quo.
CONCLUSION
We began with a brief excursion into futures imagined and real.
Neither, frankly speaking, is particularly encouraging. That there will
be compromise and change is virtually certain; how it will all shake out
is unknown. In the meantime, we must hedge our bets. What has been
discussed above offers a small sliver of improvement, a possible medium
term solution. It is specific to our current circumstances, taking into
account existing legal regimes, socio-political trends, the mechanics of
the research programs we have chosen to support (including traditional
practices) and the public perspective on those programs.
In our interconnected age, life has become an uncontrolled experi-
ment with a single test subject: what we create or change anywhere may,
for better or for worse, have influence on the whole. Because the stakes
are therefore higher, it is prudent for us to spread our search for solutions
into as many research programmes as is practical. We prefer markets to
organize a good deal of this research activity, and as such we must be
content to work with IPRs and to coordinate our efforts in this regard. Of
course in the case of widespread catastrophe, we can always pull on emer-
gency levers: temporary suspension of IPRs or compulsory licensing. Yet
such levers must be used sparingly; overuse will affect revenues, which
will discourage investment and ultimately research.
Despite the attempts made to harmonize IPRs through such
instruments as UPOV and TRIPs, the terms of agreement are unsubtle
and the implementation chaotic: the standards tend towards one-size-
fits-all, and the several instruments and agendas are in various stages
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of implementation, with more on the horizon in the form of the TPP. Yet
wholesale reform, which might be the optimal solution from a formal
perspective, is simply not feasible. The creation and national adoption of
international instruments, especially those that call for actual reform of
existing national law as opposed to mere accretion, operate on timescales
that exceed what we can afford with respect to food security.
Fortunately for us, western legal traditions have longstanding
familiarity with the challenge of adapting existing laws to changing cir-
cumstances, avoiding grand transformations of legal form yet achieving
the practical outcomes desired. Although I think this adaptive capacity
not limited to the common law, Blackstone expressed it well:
Our system of remedial law resembles an old Gothic cas-
tle, erected in the days of chivalry, but fitted up for a
modern inhabitant. The moated ramparts, the embattled
towers, and the trophied halls, are magnificent and vener-
able, but useless, and therefore neglected. The interior
apartments, now accommodated to daily use, are cheerful
and commodious, though their approaches may be winding
and difficult.195
The proposal here, to adopt utility models in order to address the
shortcomings of the current regime governed by UPOV and TRIPs, cir-
cumvents the need for grand reform. It could nevertheless effect signifi-
cant change, providing better support for biodiversity through accelerated
research in commercial breeding, and possibly for traditional practices
as well. There is no question that from a formal perspective, this way of
proceeding makes our arrangements seem messy; but if we want to keep
the whole castle, we must be willing to tolerate its idiosyncrasies.
As Blackstone noted, however, venerable though our previous
arrangements may be, they are not always useful. Through changes in
sentiment, interest, or circumstance, we may later decide to demolish cer-
tain halls and towers, rather than keeping them largely unlit and unused.
When we do, we may also take the opportunity to build new apartments,
and thereby new traditions, together.
195 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 267–68 (1767).
